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and efficiency, of which few exist for the prewar period 11 , are still lacking for the interwar period. +5.7 % +5.9 % -0.2 % +0.5 % Sources: Output and employment: Fischer (1989), p. 33; Fischer (1995) , p. 35. Output per man-shift: Burghardt (1995) , p. 382; Gillingham (1985) , p. 57; Wisotzky (1983) , p. 74. Author's own computations.
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It is the purpose of this paper to examine the relationship between aggregate labour productivity change and mine dynamics at the Ruhr in more detail. To identify the sources of the interwar surge in aggregate labour productivity described above, we analyse mine-level data on production, employment, and productivity covering the full population of Ruhr (hard!) coal mines over 1913-38. Our special interest lies in testing the view that 'negative rationalization' in the form of the exceptional mine closure wave of the later 1920s significantly contributed to improvements in aggregate productivity. To that end, we apply a source decomposition method that enables us to separate the contribution of mine closures from that of newly enter-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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ing and surviving mines; or, put slightly differently, the contribution of a re-allocation of resources between mines in contrast to technological improvements at individual mines. This method has recently been used, for example, to explore the micro-level sources of labour productivity change in Japanese coal-mining during World War II. 13 This study contributes in several ways: Firstly, it sheds new light on the German coal industry's productivity performance and development over a politically and economically very troubled period. It therefore picks up the claim often made in the industrial economics literature that accurately understanding aggregate productivity trends on the sectoral or national level requires analysing firm-or even establishment-level data. Many empirical studies indeed have highlighted the importance of micro-level heterogeneity in this respect.
14 Secondly, it links up with the strand of the resource economics literature that tests the hypothesis that labour productivity in an extractive industry must fall over time as the quality of deposits coming into production successively diminishes; it is assumed that, under perfect information, the best-quality deposits are necessarily depleted first and, thus, that mineral production is exemplary for an industry operating with diminishing returns. However, this traditional view has been convincingly questioned in many cases -not the least because information in the actual world is imperfect, technological change is present, and exploration activities may add new high-quality deposits to known reserves. 15 With this study, we provide one of the few tests that mobilize economic historical evidence to explore this argument. 16 Thirdly, we gain further insight into the 'mechanics of rationalization' and the practical productivity effects of 6! ! closures as one prominent measure, the use of which certainly was not a unique feature of the mining industry. 17 Fourthly, and finally, this study also contributes to the literature on other important coal producers in Europe, and the competition among them. This primarily goes for Great Britain, which has been shown to have fallen behind Germany (and, in fact, other continental European coal producers) in terms of coal-mining productivity growth in the 1920s. 18 We proceed by briefly describing in Section II which attempts had been made to rationalize the Ruhr coal industry. Section III presents our newly constructed, original data set and provides baseline information on mine dynamics, such as the number of mine exits and entries during the observation period. Section IV outlines the methodological approach and reports the empirical findings. Finally, Section V concludes.
II. The rationalization wave in Weimar Germany
Judged by recent textbooks on German economic history, it is commonplace to view the short period of time between the stabilization of currency at the turn of 1923/24 and the Great Depression in late 1929 as, among other things, shaped by 'euphoric belief in progress and rationalization' and accelerated technological modernization of the industry and the private households' sphere. 19 However, various authors have pointed out that one should separate the broad public discussion on what rationalization meant, and on which advantages and disadvantages it would bring, from the actual extent of measures taken to, for example, introduce Knortz (2010) , p. 127.
18 Broadberry and Fremdling (1990), p. 405; Scott (2006), p. 22-24 . See, for example, also Greasley (1982 Greasley ( , 1990 ) and Garside (1992) for special accounts on productivity growth and the mechanization in the British coal industry; and Supple (1989) for the general picture.
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form of job planning, time studies, and scientific wage calculation) or push forward concentration and cooperation within and across sectors. It is thus still open to debate how much was mere 'talking rationalization', which would not cost much and would also support spreading ideology if intended, and how much was 'advancing rationalization', literally; 20 among the sceptics ranges, for example, Harold James who expresses his doubts about the existence of a 'rationalization boom' at the time. 21 In answering that question, one specific challenge has certainly been to operationalize the concept of 'rationalization' -that is, to measure how it affected indicators of business efficiency and profitability as well as, more generally, indicators of societal well-being and progress. 22 Industry and firm-related studies have provided essential insights in this respect.
23
But contemporaries already were aware of the definitional and measurement issues. Hinnenthal (1927) provides one prominent passage when he summarizes a number of circulating definitions:
"The ones say: rationalization is attempts to increase the useful effect […] . Others explain rationalization is picking the right way to simplify the process of production and distribution of goods […] . Or rationalization is defined as combining congenial or related economic forces in cartels, Freyberg (1989), pp. 23, 308-320; Lippert (1994) , p. 168); Shearer (1995); Borscheid (1996); Knortz (2010b) , pp. 31-32.
21 James (1986) , pp. 146-161. He actually made two exceptions with the automobile and coal-mining industries.
22 Stollberg (1981), p. 47; Lippert (1994) , p. 176.
23 E.g., Brady (1933); Freyberg (1989); Zimmermann (1992) ; Kleinschmidt (1993); Lippert (1994); Spoerer (1994); Peters (1996) .
24 Hinnenthal (1927) , pp. 5-6. Author's own translation of the German original. ! Perhaps most important is the latter sentence which emphasizes the need for collaboration (Gruppenarbeit) beyond sectoral boundaries and, what is more, between producers, distributors, and consumer of goods. So the purpose of the Reichskuratorium apparently was to intermediate an all-party permanent dialogue, to channel concerted action, and to advocate standardization beyond sectoral boundaries where possible.
8! !
26
In his 1930 study on the rationalization in the Ruhr coal-mining industry, Wedekind proposes a definition that takes the somewhat narrower and perhaps more practical entrepreneurial perspective, although he acknowledges, in line with Hinnenthal, that rationalization has a broader societal dimension as well:
"Rationalization in mining is 'the sum of all measures that aim -based on a scientific approach, and not rules of thumb -at reducing operating costs, facilitating human work and increasing work safety'." 27 Table 2 assembles some statistics illustrate the extent of rationalization in Ruhr coal-mining in the later 1920s. To begin with, there is the coal-winning method. Winning coal by use of manual work in combination with explosives was the dominating prewar practice. By 1925, almost one-half of coal was won by complementing manual work with cutter-scrapers and especially the pneumatic pick, which, according to Burghardt, was the 'key innovation' of the 9! ! time to raise productivity. 28 Over the next few years, the share of pure manual work and work with explosives was further reduced to a marginal four percent. Additional measures not reflecting new technology were put under the header 'negative rationalization'. 33 Besides the strategy to close mines that were assessed as inefficient, which we will come back to in more detail in the following two Sections, these measures included the reduction of work points underground which visibly increased the production per operating point (see Table 2 ). It might be argued, though, that much in this direction had been apparently achieved after 1929, during the Great Depression. Burghardt (1990) Even if the stylized facts presented so far may convey the impression of a success story, the mines at the Ruhr still had to cope with the after-effects of the war. Principally since August 1914, the German economy had laboured under coal shortage; and the territorial losses and reparations in coal due to the Treaty of Versailles further increased the pressure on the supply side. This, for example, led to many new, but rather small mines being opened during the inflationary period (see below); many of these mines, however, were closed only some years later as they were not competitive. Besides, the practice of overexploiting the already developed and high-quality deposits -commonly referred to as Raubbau in the German literatureand of postponing additional replacement and expansion investments caused severe asset erosion. Towards the mid-1920s, increased domestic competition with brown coal and also tight-
10! !
11! !
er international competition substituted the problem of coal shortage for the problem of stagnating demand.
34
One after-effect especially plagued mines during the later 1920s, and that was the labour force having gained bargaining power to a hitherto unprecedented extent.
35 Following
Borchardt, the struggle between labour and capital, which emerged once the old political order had been overthrown in 1918/19, led to an overexpansion of the welfare state which set limits to government policies, especially on the peak of the Great Depression, and thus accelerated Weimar's decline. 36 The view that wages and ancillary wage costs all over the economy were too high to be sustainable has certainly been controversially debated since. 37 But evidence on the Ruhr coalmines seems to suggest that rationalization did not bring a significant reduction in operating costs. Labour costs -that is, wages, salaries, and employers' contributions to social insurance together -accounted for well about two-thirds, or more, of all costs (as of 1927/28), the remaining part being material (e.g., timber, explosives, building materials, energy) and miscellaneous costs (e.g., taxes and freight). 38 Based on counterfactual estimations of wage costs per (usable) ton over 1924-28 assuming constant wages, contemporary expert Ernst Jüngst, for example, voiced that labour costs at the Ruhr had actually remained quite stable over the rationalization period (between 8.8 and 9.9 Reichmarks), although more coal had been extracted with less miners. 39 Had wages themselves remained constant on their late 1924-level, so the counterfactual goes, labour costs would have fallen towards 6.5 Reichmarks per ton, as of the end of 1928. So it seems that a large part of rationali- Burghardt (1990) , p. 21. This trend was certainly reinforced by basic improvements in energy and heating efficiency.
35 E.g, Tschirbs (1986) ; Shearer (1989); Hartewig (1992) ; Plumpe (1999) .
36 Borchardt (1979 Borchardt ( , 1980 . 37 E.g., Holtfrerich (1984) ; von Kruedener (1985) .
38 Jüngst (1929) , p. 84.
39 Jüngst (1929) , p. 118. This, of course, does not mean 12! ! zation gains were redistributed to workers. It quite fits that the profitability of mining firms is said to have been rather modest. Spoerer (1995) estimated the average return-on-equity for mining and investment-goods corporations to have been 2.1 percent over 1925-29, which lay markedly below the average for the nazi period (i.e., 1933-41: 12.5 percent), but also below prewar levels. 40 Hence, we may doubt that rationalization in mining brought a significant reduction in operating costs.
III. A primer in Ruhr coal mine survival
Data sources
To explore the mine dynamics at the Ruhr in more detail, we make use of a unique source that
has not yet been exploited in a fashion comparable to ours. offers annualized mine-level information on firm affiliation, coal quality, coal output (in tons), by-product output (e.g., tons of coking coal or ammonia), and employment of, as we believe, every mine at the Ruhr. So we are confident that, in analysing this source, we are dealing with the population of Ruhr mines.
For the sake of comparability, we decided not just to zoom into 1924-29, our primary period of interest, but to extend observation back to 1913 and forth to 1938. Entry and espe- Spoerer (1995) , pp. 152-155.! 41 The Jahrbuch für den Oberbergamtsbezirk Dortmund, in turn, was first published in 1893; it was renamed in Jahrbuch für den Ruhrkohlenbezirk in 1932.
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cially exit patterns are recoverable from the reported statistical data in combination with given notes on dates of entry, phases of operation, phases of temporary closure, and dates of terminal closure. Table 3 presents a summary of our original data set. On the whole, we observed 303 different mines over 26 years resulting in an unbalanced panel of 4,650 mine-yearcombinations. Of these mines, 117 -or 39 percent -are both left and right censored -i.e., survived the entire observation period; another 30 mines came into operation after 1913 and remained in the data set until 1938; a further 78 mines already existed in 1913 and exited before 1938; and 78 mines both entered and exited the data set some time during 1913-38. Different mines in the data set 303
Number of mine-year-combinations observed 4,650
Sources: Author's own depiction.
What constitutes a mine? A practical, though tautological, definition on the boundaries of a mine follows from the Bergwerke und Salinen directly: What is explicitly reported a as production unit in there, has to be taken as representing a self-standing mine. However, mines defined in this fashion still exhibited a lot of heterogeneity. As for technology, on the one extreme, we are dealing with really small mines that extracted coal via near-to-the-surface tunnels; and, on the other extreme, we are dealing with those really large mines that used vertically sunk shafts up to 1,000 metres depth. It is imperative to bear in mind that a mine in this sense could have extracted coal from just one shaft, but also from four or five. This may complicate the comparison of the figures we will present with any source or study that uses even 14! ! more disaggregated information on the shaft-level, which the Bergwerke und Salinen might not give. We will refer back to this point at times as it has a bearing on the question of what might be the correct number of closures and the correct shut-down capacity in Ruhr coalmining.
Number of operating mines, entrants, and exits
In Figure 1 two graphs of the number of mines at the Ruhr are shown as deduced from our data set. The upper graph is made of all 4,650 mine-year observations regardless of whether or not mines were reported as actually producing a certain amount of coal. The lower graph only counts mines in operation -that is, mines with a non-zero output. Three cases of reported zero output have to be acknowledged: i) following entry, it still took some time to make a mine fully operational; ii) a mine temporarily went out of production; and iii) a mine that had already been terminally closed, was reported further on because it still produced some byproduct output, but no coal any more.
In fact, both graphs imply the same time pattern. As can be seen, around 180 mines were reported as operative in 1913. That number remained stable until 1919, but then rose by 30 mines, in net terms, to about 210 in 1922. On the one hand, this might be explained by inflation, which reduced the barriers for founding a business by making credit costs cheaper; on the other hand, besides mere adverse incentives due to the distorted money system, the postwar coal shortage called for additional supply and, thus, might have presented a worthwhile opportunity to start a mine. 42 However, that 'founding fever' came to an end in 1924,
As suggested in the previous subsection, our series deviate from other series in the literature. Figure A .1 in the Appendix shows the series compiled by Fischer (1989 Fischer ( , 1995 exiting mines by year and mode. In fact, a mine could enter the data set in one of two ways: It was literally newly established, which we refer to as 'new opening'; or it appeared on the scene because an already existent mine had been split into two, or more, mines that would be
Ibbenbürener Bergbauunternehmer ('Union of Ibbenbüren Mining Entrepreneurs'). As the name suggests, this reflects a larger number of mines -70, as of 1920, for example (Verband für die bergbaulichen Interessen 1921, p. 108). These were all small-scale mines operating in the Ibbenbüren mining district, and due to the fact that they were aggregated in our source, we counted them as one. Over the following years, many of these small mines were closed. reported separately thereafter ('internal splitting'). In a substantive sense, an internal splitting is, of course, a false entry because these mines have already existed in the data beforehand, in terms of output and employment. However, we must account for this form of entry in decomposing aggregate productivity. Analogous to entries, we also have to acknowledge that mines could have disappeared in more than just one way from the data set: by terminal closure; by internal merger; and by end of report. Panel (b) in Figure 2 in combination with Table 4 highlights that, indeed, the majority of terminal closures occurred over 1924-29 -77, or about nine percent over 1924-26 and still slightly over five percent over 1927-29. Among these closures were many of the mines that had been brought into operation shortly before, during the inflated 'founding fever'. Besides, not few internal mergers occurred where, within a particular firm, two or more mines were operationally put together which showed up in the way they were reported in the Bergwerke und Salinen. 43 Here, we are dealing, of course, with false exits since the data still account for the production capacity post-merger. Entailed in the series on internal mergers are also few exits that are the result of the report on them ending abruptly; 44 among these are the
In the literature this is often referred to as the tendency to form Verbundbergwerke ('compound mines'); see, for example, Burghardt (1990), p. 29. 44 This is probably due to the reform of the mining administration districts' boundaries in 1933.
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Verband Ibbenbürener Bergbauunternehmer and the Ibbenbürener Steinkohlenbergwerk, one of the state-owned mines, for which the data streams ends in 1932 without a closure being implied as the very reason.
45
Were the closed mines the most unproductive?
Based on standard economic thinking, it seems plausible to assume that mines subject to terminal closure must have been the most inefficient and most unproductive ones. However, we may add some flesh to the bone and take a closer look at the characteristics of the closed mines. To begin with, Table 5 reports descriptive statistics on mine size in terms of tons of coal and employment by period to convey an impression of the micro-level heterogeneity in Ruhr coal-mining. As is obvious, the range in mine size was quite substantial, regardless of the period, with the largest mine producing beyond 3.5 million tons. If we took minimum mine size conditional on output being not zero, we would find that the annual minimum scores varied between a mere two (1921) and very modest 2,660 (1938) tons. What is more, the average mine in 1913-38 produced about 550,000 tons of coal utilizing a total workforce of nearly 2,100, and average mine size by period fluctuated around these values pretty closely.
The ratio of average mine size to maximum mine size in terms of tons of coal ranged between 8.2 (1919-23) and 20.0 (1933-38) percent; and in terms of employment, between 10.5 (1919-
Note that the number of exits we report does slightly deviate from that reported by the Verein für die bergbaulichen Interessen in another statistical publication (Statistisches Heft, May 1935); see Table A .1 in the Appendix.
The difference seems to be a matter of differences in the degree of disaggregation. The list in the Statistisches Heft refers to 1920-34 and mentions a number of closures we cannot trace on the basis of our source. This is because these 'excess closures' refer to single shafts -shafts that our source does not separately report on. One 19! ! 23) and 18.8 (1933-38) percent. These figures already highlight that there was considerable heterogeneity among Ruhr coalmines. The economic literature has developed a number of ad-hoc measures of minimum efficient size in an industry based exclusively on the size distribution of establishments or firms. Average mine size as depicted in Table 5 would correspond to the approach commonly associated with Pashigian (1969) . 46 However, it might be questioned that average mine size is the most appropriate ad-hoc measure in our case for the reason that the standard deviation and distance to maximum size are quite high. It seems as if a large part of output was mined in higher segments of the size distribution. 47 Therefore, Figure 3 reports two other measures corresponding to Weiss's mid-point plant size, which implies that 50 percent of overall output comes from
Other popular measures include Weiss's (1963) mid-point plant size index and Comanor and Wilson's (1967) top-50-percent-index. 47 In fact, the share in production of mines sized between 250,000 and 750,000 tons varied considerably and, at times, amounted to around 50 percent (i.e., in 1915, 1919, 1924, 1932, and 1933) . In 1913 and 1938, the shares were 35 and 13 percent; and over 1925-29 it amounted to 29 percent, on average.
20! !
plants larger than mid-point plant size and 50 percent from plants smaller. We computed midpoint mine output accordingly from the size distribution of Ruhr coalmines and determined mid-point mine employment as the employment of the mid-point mine. Both mid-point mine output and employment show substantial variation over time as, of course, they are not independent of the business-cycle. The long-term average of mid-point mine output (employment) was 871,000 tons (3,350 workers). In particular, it stands out that over 1925-28, mid-point mine output was similar to prewar conditions; only in 1929, and then again in 1937 and 1938, had it risen to a level markedly above one million tons. The picture regarding mid-point mine employment is slightly different. The years 1924-25 were used to downsize employment in mining again, after Ruhr mines had served as a 'labour sponge' over de-mobilization (1919-22) . 48 However, it should strike the observer that the mid-point mine 21! ! still used more miners over the rationalization period than in 1913 -and that is, while producing a similar quantity of coal. Now that we have some basic information on heterogeneity among Ruhr mines at hand, what were the characteristics of closed mines during the rationalization period and before and after? Again by period, Table 6 gives a first answer to this question by reporting average mine size among closures, their average cumulative percent share in total coal output, and the size of the largest mine closed in the respective periods. That information is given for two years -for the year in which the closure occurred and for the year prior to the year of closure. This is intended to allow for the possibility that mines might not have been closed all of a sudden, out of full-scale operation, but in a way that output and employment were gradually run down over maybe a couple of years ('gradual shut-down'). To look only at the closed mines' characteristics in the year of closure (t c ) might then fail to accurately describe them.
Firstly, the average mine closed during 1914-38 was quite small in both t c and t c -1 compared to the simple period means and mid-point mine output discussed above. Since this holds for average employment, too, the closed mines must have had, on average, belowaverage employment shares which will be relevant for the decomposition procedure used in the subsequent section. Secondly, notwithstanding business cycle fluctuations, the fact that average mine size was higher in t c -1 than in t c in all periods but one (i.e., the war period)
shows that mines were gradually shut down. Thirdly, the closed mines' average cumulative share in total output, as a measure of shut down capacity, was consequently quite low, too.
The largest annual shares in t c (t c -1) amounted to two (3.2) and 1.9 (3.2) percent in 1925 (1924) and 1928 (1927) , respectively. Thus, at this stage, we may already doubt that the productivity effect of closures could have been really significant.
The cumulative shares we derived are notably lower than those implied by the data published elsewhere, in the Statistisches Heft. While we measure shut-down capacity in actual production of the year, the alternative shutdown capacity given in Table A .1 in the Appendix was computed, per year, as the sum of each mine's maximum Finally, we turn to the question of whether the closed mines were the worst performers in terms of labour productivity. Therefore Table 7 shows the closed mines' position in the labour productivity distribution. Given are the absolute and relative numbers per quintile and period for again the year of closure and the previous one. 50 In the year of closure itself, and except for the Great War, the majority of closed mines clustered in the bottom quintile. Adding the second quintile, at least about 80 percent of closures visibly lay in the lower half of the distribution. However, it must also be noted that a couple of closed mines lay in the upper half.
22! !
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Regarding the performance in t c -1, it still holds for three out of five periods (i.e., 1919-23, 1924-29, and 1933-38) that at least 50 percent of closed mines ranged in the bottom quintile and 76 in the bottom and second quintile together.
production occurring in the five years preceding the closure. So those estimates may, literally, convey an impression of the production potential. 50 In selecting quintiles, we follow Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992), p. 1992. In their study of the closure wave in postwar UK coal-mining, Glyn and Machin (1997) , pp. 204-205, for example, depict percentile ranks.! 51 Glyn and Machin (1997) , for example, could show that the same held true the closure wave in the UK in the 1970s and 1980s. In all, it seems to be appropriate to think of the majority of closed as mines as having belonged to the group of worse performers; this does not necessarily mean that they were the worst performers being, literally, at the very end of the distribution (some certainly were).
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These results should, however, be taken with some caution since labour productivity alone does not reflect all variables on the basis of which mining entrepreneurs may have decided to shut down a mine. This especially goes for the closed mines ranging in the upper part of the distribution. Even if they operated with relatively high productivity in their last year, this does not mean they could have maintained that productivity levels in the future.
IV. The productivity implications of closures
Methodology
According to equation (1), our empirical setting is based on the notion that industry-level labour productivity is a weighted average of mine-specific productivity scores where y i , l i , Y
24! !
and L denote output and employment of mine i and, respectively, of the industry aggregate at time t. Here, a mine's productivity is weighted with its share in total employment: classified as entrants in year t are those units that did not operate in t-τ, but began producing in t; and classified as exits in t are those units that did not make it from period t-τ into t.
Hence, entrants and exits are classified as such only in the period of the closure or opening event, but not in the periods preceding closure or following entry; otherwise they are survivors, too.
Based on these subsets, productivity change may be decomposed into five effects: 
25!
The within-effect measures the contribution of establishment-level changes in productivity to aggregate productivity by holding weights -i.e., employment shares -constant. The betweeneffect captures contributions resulting from shifting employment shares weighted with the deviation of establishment-level productivity from the industry-average in the previous period. In addition, the cross-, or covariance-, effect combines the two effects which are confined to the subset of survivors. Finally, the entry-and exit-effects, too, are based on deviations of establishment-level productivity from the industry-average.
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Due to the data structure outlined in the previous section, some adjustments to this decomposition method seem to be in order. As we are dealing, at least in an accounting sense, with several modes of entry and exit, we intend to split the baseline subsets further. So, regarding the subset of survivors, we will distinguish into i) surviving mines that survived over the entire observation period 1913-1938 (subset S 1 ), ii) mines newly opened in t from t+τ on until 1938 (subset S 2 ), iii) mines having entered another way in t from t+τ on until 1938 (subset S 3 ), iv) mines having survived until t-τ before they were closed in t (subset S 4 ); and v) mines having survived until t-τ before they exited another way in t (subset S 5 ). Note that those mines that both entered and exited sometime in the observation period are part of subsets S 4 or S 5 . Further decomposing the within-, between-, and cross-effects this way enables us to
A related decomposition procedure is that of Griliches and Regev (1995) who, however, do not incorporate the cross-term and specify the weights differently.! "within-effect" "between-effect" "cross-effect" "entry-effect" "exit-effect"
26! ! check whether the productivity effect of closures might have come into play time before the closure actually occurred, due then to gradual shut-down. In the same manner, we will further decompose the entry-and exit-effects into the entry-by-new-opening-effect (subset E 1 ), the entry-by-internal-splitting-effect (subset E 2 ), the exit-by-closure-effect (subset X 1 ), and the exit-by-internal-merger-effect ,which includes the exits due to end of report (subset X 2 ).
Regarding our research question, the exit-by-closure-effect is the one of primary interest. It forms part of what a shift in the location of mining contributes to productivity changethat is, a reallocation of resources from low-to high-productivity mines (or vice versa).
Hence, in order to link up our results with the approach taken in the resource economics literature (e.g., Aydin and Tilton 2000; Ellerman, Stoker and Berndt 2001; Garcia, Knights and Tilton 2001) , the 19 single sources we identify (within-, between-and cross-effects for five subsets of survivors plus two entry-and two exit-effects) may be re-arranged to the 'shift-inlocation-effect' and the 'development-at-individual-mines-effect'. To get the former, the between-, entry-, and exit-effects are put together; and to get the latter, we re-aggregate the within-effects over the subsets of survivors; due to its nature, we will report the cross-effect separately. To draw a bow back to the historical case under study, it should be highlighted that what contemporaries called 'positive rationalization' in the context of Ruhr coal-mining is fully contained in the 'development-at-individual-mines-effect', as is the part of 'negative rationalization' that was also confined to individual mines (i.e., the concentration of operating points underground).
Empirical evidence
In the following, we go through the decomposition procedure in several steps. All results are based on the aforementioned 19 single effects, which are reported year-by-year in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
To begin with, Table 8 presents a summary of the source decomposition, which already yields a couple of basic insights into the mine dynamics during the later 1920s and the 27! ! comparative periods. In the upper part of the table it is shown the cumulative absolute change in labour productivity and the five main effects as aggregates over the relevant single effects; the corresponding explanatory percentage shares of each sub-aggregate in total productivity change are reported in the lower part. Corresponding to Table 1 , aggregate labour productivity declined towards 1924, but then climbed up again towards 1938. Arithmetically, the increase in productivity over early rationalization not only compensated, but over-compensated the previous decline. It is apparent from the percentages that productivity dynamics, generally, were by far dominated by withinmine performance. However, it is also apparent that the relative weight of productivity in-
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The percentage shares were derived by dividing an effect's absolute value by the sum over all effects' absolute values.
28! !
creases within surviving mines declined (from 96 to 79 percent) and, thus, the compositional effects, reflecting between-mine flows of output and inputs, gained importance over time, such that they finally accounted for about one-fifth of aggregate productivity change.
56
Among the compositional effects, the between-and also the cross-effect appear to have been slightly more important than the entry-and exit-effects. Apart from the Great War, the between-effect was straight positive implying that, on average (based on the within-effect), mines with above industry-average productivity increased their employment shares. The cross-effect, however, was negative in four out of six periods which indicates that, to use the terminology of Baily, Bartelsman and Haltiwanger (1996) , resource re-allocations among survivors were predominantly triggered by successful downsizing (i.e., Δ(l/L) < 0 and Δ(y/l) > 0) or, respectively, by unsuccessful upsizing (i.e., Δ(l/L) > 0 and Δ(y/l) < 0). 57 In contrast resource flows among continuing mines in the early rationalization period, as well as in the depression years, were dominated by a combination of successful upsizing (i.e., Δ(l/L) > 0 and Δ(y/l) > 0) and unsuccessful downsizing (i.e., Δ(l/L) < 0 and Δ(y/l) < 0).
Furthermore, the exit effect on which our primary focus rests is positive for all periods but the inflationary period implying that mine exits, overall, positively contributed to labour productivity change over those periods; that is, labour productivity change would have been somewhat lower, maybe even negative, ceteris paribus, had exits not occurred. Obvious-
Here, a comparison with Okazaki's (2014) , p. 44, figures on Japanese mining is interesting. He found that over 1930-35 the compositional effects accounted for slightly more than the average 20 percent we found for the Ruhr, namely about 26 percent (computed according to Footnote 54). But, regarding the period 1935-39, he established that compositional effects were responsible for even about 60 percent of aggregate productivity change. This is a striking difference to what we find on the Ruhr, even though we do not have the year 1939 in our data set, which may account for part of that difference.
57 Baily, Bartelsman and Haltiwanger (1996) , p. 263. Whether there was large number of successful downsizers and unsuccessful upsizers with each small effects or only few of them with large effects over-compensating successful upsizers and unsuccessful downsizers, is a matter that would have to be explored.!
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ly, apart from 1919-23, the mines selected for exit were among the prime candidates to select from, in terms of productivity performance. Note that, due to how the exit effect is defined in the decomposition formula, we have to shift the whole series depicted in Table 9, shown, the majority of exits -55 (i.e., due to how exit is defined in our decomposition, the years 1923-25), in fact -occurred over 1924-26, these exits do not explain one percent of aggregate productivity change over that period. In turn, 37 exits over 1927-29 (i.e., the years 1926-28 in Figure 2 ) at least explain 4.6 percent. Thus, we can already conclude that, in terms of improving aggregate productivity, the exit wave over 1924-26 really is negligible, and this view is reinforced by the comparison with the other periods.
Table 8 also shows that entering mines had positively contributed to aggregate productivity during rationalization and the early nazi period meaning they had above-average productivity. To be more specific on whether new openings and terminal closures or rather internal splittings and mergers had driven the turnover effects, Table 9 presents the separate effects year-by-year. We confine the discussion here to the period 1924-32 as most exits occurred then. So when internal splittings occurred, they had the larger weight in the total entryeffect, except for 1927. This is not a surprise as the necessary surface and underground structures including machinery had already existed and thus enabled the internally split mine to be fully operational from its start (a 'false' start, actually). To be more precise, in 1928 and 1929, the internal splitting effect even compensated for negative effects from new openings. If the effect of the closures themselves were rather modest overall, maybe it was the re-allocation of resources over the years preceding the closures that affected aggregate productivity more profoundly? Table 10 provides information that may help to assess the closed mines' pre-closure contributions when they still were classified as survivors. In the upper part of the table, under 'A.', the cumulated employment shares for the closure-cohorts 1923-32 (corresponding to the exit-effects depicted in Table 9 ) are shown for the year of closure and the previous five years. As can be seen, the closure-cohorts 1926, 1929, and 1932 had the largest aggregate employment shares. If the supposition was right that mines were usually not closed all of a sudden, out of full operation, but gradually, we should find that the closure-cohorts' aggregate employment shares fell towards t c . Except for the closure-cohort 1923, this is indeed what we can observe. At the earliest, employment shares began to be lowered four years before closure (1928); at the latest, they were visibly lower in the year of closure itself (1925, 1931) . According to our decomposition procedure, this reduction in employment shares substantiates the resource re-allocation from the closed mines to the continuing high(er) productivity mines, when they were still operative.
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However, falling employment shares are a necessary condition for this resource flow.
As sufficient condition, compositional effects should be positive and preferably big. Part 'C.'
in combination with 'D.' yields insights on that. The aggregate within-effects by closurecohort are added for illustrative purposes. The closure-cohorts 1923 The closure-cohorts , 1928 The closure-cohorts , and 1930 declining labour productivity over gradual shut-down. The cumulative effect of the other co-
58 For illustrative purposes, Table A .2 in the Appendix lists the fifteen largest exit-by-closure effects. 59 Aggregate output shares likewise fell; and as discussed in relation to Table 7 , the mines that were subject to closures mostly were below-average-productivity mines.!
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horts is positive, though this does not necessarily mean that the effect in the year of closure itself was positive. Much more instructive is the evidence on the cumulated compositional effects. Six closurecohorts, of which three actually fall into the 'rationalization boom' and three into the Great Depression, show a positive cumulated compositional effect over gradual shut-down. For these cohorts it holds that resources were set free to be used more efficiently in continuing mines with high(er)-productivity. In fact, in an accounting sense, mines belonging to the remaining closure-cohorts stripped the remaining mines from resources, which were not brought in effi-33! ! cient use thereafter. In order to get a sense of the magnitude of the compositional effects over the shut-down period, we may compare them with the exit-by-closure-effects in Table 9 ) has to be associated with a gradual-shut-down-effect that was larger than its exit-by-closure-effect. But, whatever the angle, evidence generally indicates that the effect of closures on aggregate productivity practically operated, however modest it were, through the closure itself, and only occasionally through resource allocation shortly before closure, over the shut-down period.
Finally, Figure 4 summarizes the evidence by plotting the cumulative turnover-effects over the full observation period. Note once again that these effects confine to the year of the event itself and not to the performance of entrants and exits when they ( As Panel (b) shows, the cumulative effect of internal splittings was marginally higher than that of closures and due, chiefly, to splittings in 1933. A final striking feature certainly is that entrants' performance, as far as their first year of operation is concerned, depressed aggregate productivity. On the whole, as has been argued above, the turnover-effects still were modest compared to the within-and compositional effects among survivors. 
V. Conclusion
Over the later 1920s and up to the mid-1930s, Ruhr coalmines saw an exceptional surge in labour productivity, paralleled only by the 1960s and early 1970s. 60 Owing to the Ruhr coal district's weight in the industry this surge dictated the pattern on the national level. This study set out to examine the micro-level sources of that exceptional growth by analyzing a newlyconstructed dataset on the population of Ruhr coalmines over a period spanning the Great War, the Weimar Republic, and the first six years of nazi dictatorship. Based on the commonly accepted view that the later 1920s stand out as reflecting a 'rationalization boom' and a technological catching-up with the latest prewar developments, we tested the hypothesis that mine closures as a measure of 'negative rationalization' played a significant role in pushing aggregate productivity up to new levels. As a somewhat necessary condition in this respect, the frequency with which closures were conducted was definitely much higher over 1924-29 than over the surrounding periods, including the depression years.
So, did closures actually do any good to aggregate labour productivity? Based on the results from the decomposition of productivity change, we can safely say that closures regularly raised aggregate productivity in the year after the closure had been conducted; and we can also say that over half the 'rationalization boom ' (1925-27) , closures likewise pushed productivity by way of ceding resources to high(er) productivity mines that would, in most cases, continue operation for more than just a few years. However, evidence has been provided that all forms of turnover-effects including exit-by-closure were marginal compared to the effects stemming from the producer dynamics among surviving mines. Thus, we feel confident to conclude that the practical productivity implications of mine closures over the rationalization boom are negligible and still overrated in the relevant literature. These findings call There are two caveats to this interpretation that should be mentioned. Firstly, although low productivity may usually go hand in hand with more unfavourable cost-structures, it has to be borne in mind that this study did not analyze costs explicitly. In the longer-term, the mine closures may well have taken considerable cost pressure off mining firms. Secondly, as Harvie (1996) has us consider, labour productivity of surviving mines might not be independ- Finally, by answering the question of how significant mine turnover-effects practically were for aggregate labour productivity change, we at the same answered the question of how significant technological improvements at individual mines were that continued operation. In line with the resource economics literature, the combination of turnover-and compositional-effects is indicative of how a shift in the location of mining affected industry performance. Figure 5 presents our conclusive argument in this respect. Generally, changes at individual mines played the dominant role in determining productivity, which supports the view in the recent resource economics literature mentioned above. However, it has to be noted that 1927, 1933 , and also 1937 stand out as years in which the shift-in-location-effect was relatively more important than usual. Harvie (1996) , p. 422. Notes: For the definitions of the subsets, see Section IV. All effects in tons of coal per worker.
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Sources: See Figure 1 . Author's own computations.
